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Abstract
First-order modal logic is very much under current development, with many di(erent semantics
proposed. The use of rigid objects goes back to Saul Kripke. More recently, several semantics
based on counterparts have been examined, in a development that goes back to David Lewis.
There is yet another line of research, using intensional objects, that traces back to Richard
Montague. I have been involved with this line of development for some time. In the present
paper, I brie3y sketch several of the approaches to 4rst-order modal logic. Then I present one
that I call FOIL (for 4rst-order intensional logic) in the Montague tradition that, I believe, is
both expressive and natural. I brie3y discuss in what sense it can be made to encompass the
other approaches. Finally, I provide tableau rules to go with the FOIL semantics.
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1. Introduction
What is 4rst-order modal logic for? Since this is obviously not a simple question;
perhaps we should begin by asking, what is propositional modal logic for? Here we are
on well-explored ground. With propositional modal logic, and its relational semantics,
we want to explicate various constructs from natural language, and explore nuances of
certain concepts arising in philosophical investigations. We want to model knowledge,
at least in an ideal sense. We want to reason about action. And there is another
purpose as well, one that has become clearer over the years. In studying propositional
modal logics—primarily those characterized by classes of frames—we are also studying
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fragments of classical 4rst-order (and higher-order) logic. This is known as correspon-
dence theory. For this purpose, axiomatizability (or not) is a central issue. In addition,
axiom systems allow the construction of canonical models, which provides a meta-
mathematical methodology that is uniform across many logics. Details matter a great
deal, of course, but the broad outlines of propositional modal logics have been stan-
dardized for some time.
But the original question above was, what is 9rst-order modal logic for? What do
quanti4ers add to the mix? Motivations based on natural language and philosophy
are still central, though we have a much richer variety of things we can potentially
formalize and investigate. Of course, we want a semantics that agrees with our intuitive
understanding, but now intuitions can, and do, di(er substantially from person to person.
Are designators rigid? Can objects exist in more than one possible world? Should there
be a distinction between identity and necessary identity? And for that matter, is the
whole subject a mistake from the beginning, as Quine would have it? Rather than a
semantics on which we all generally agree, quite a disparate range has been proposed.
We are still exploring what 4rst-order modal semantics should be; the propositional
case was settled long ago.
One motivation has disappeared, however. It does not seem to be useful to think of
4rst-order modal logic as a way of studying fragments of classical logic. This means the
role of frames, while still interesting, is not as central. And issues of axiomatizability,
while also interesting, are not as critical either. In guiding a robot, or understanding
natural language, automatibility is fundamental. This suggests a shift in emphasis to
tableaus or resolution. But we still have the problem of just what a 4rst-order modal
logic should look like.
Current research in the semantics of 4rst-order modal logic seems to have divided
into two broad camps, one based on counterpart relations, the other based on inten-
sional objects. The counterpart relation approach originated in work of David Lewis
and was originally meant to address philosophical problems. More recently, beginning
with Ghilardi, counterpart semantics has had an additional layer of complexity added
to it, resulting in a semantics that behaves very well metamathematically, though its
philosophical motivation is more obscure. Intensional objects trace back to Montague
(and Carnap), and are the basis of a good deal of work of my own. Personally, I am
more comfortable with this approach, both informally and technically, but that may be
just my prejudice.
In this paper, I will sketch the background of 4rst-order modal semantics, leading up
to why elaborations like counterpart semantics or intensional objects were introduced
in the 4rst place. But primarily, I will present a rich system based on intensional
objects—I call it 9rst-order intensional logic, or FOIL for short. FOIL is not really
new—versions of it have been around for some time, but this is the 4rst presentation of
it as a fully elaborated 4rst-order modal system. I also present a sketch of counterpart
semantics, and discuss how such an approach can be embedded into FOIL. This sug-
gests an extension of the notion of frame which has a certain naturalness, and which
provides satisfying completeness results. Finally, I will also give a tableau system for
FOIL. Basically, I hope to 4nd buyers among those logicians who are still shopping
around.
M. Fitting / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127 (2004) 171–193 173
2. General considerations
Some comments on terminology, before I really begin. Throughout this paper, I
will be working with 4rst-order languages in which atomic formulas have relation
symbols and variables, and formulas are built up from these using logical connectives,
quanti4ers, and and  in the usual way. It is simplest in this survey paper to
omit constant and function symbols, though it is straightforward to add them. Some
additional syntactic machinery will be introduced in Section 5.2. I will use x; y; : : : ; with
and without subscripts, as variables (later a second kind of variable will be introduced,
but these will still be present). I will use P;Q; : : : as relation symbols. I will call the
resulting language the basic 9rst-order modal language.
Throughout this paper, I will use G as a set of possible worlds and R as an
accessibility relation. If M is a model (whatever that may be), I will write M;  |=v; 	
to symbolize that formula 	 is true at possible world  of model M, with respect to
valuation v, which assigns values to free variables. This terminology and notation is
far from standard, so the literature must be read with care, though there will always
be some version of valuation and truth at a world with respect to it, whatever it is
called and however it is noted.
There are only two general conditions that apply throughout—I state them here once
and for all.
Negation: M; v ¬X ⇔M;  v X .
Propositional connectives: M; v X ∧Y ⇔M; v X and M; v Y , and similarly
for other propositional connectives.
Conditions for quanti4ers and modalities can vary—I will discuss them on a case
by case basis. I will assume an equality relation symbol is part of the language, and
if it is interpreted by the equality relation I will say a model is normal.
3. Rigidity
Variables may be given world-independent meanings in models. Such meanings are
said to be rigid. Historically, this was the 4rst quanti4ed modal semantics to be intro-
duced [12,16], and technically it is the simplest approach. There are several variations
in detail, but essentially the two discussed below are the main versions.
3.1. Varying domain models
A varying domain model is a structure, M= 〈G;R;D;I〉, meeting the conditions
that follow. D is a domain function from G to non-empty sets. For ∈G, D() is the
domain of world . The domain of the model is
⋃
∈G D(). I is an interpretation
function, mapping n-place relation symbols to functions from G to n-ary relations on
the domain of the model. Note that the values I assigns are not rigid—they are
functions on worlds. This is the case with every semantics proposed for quanti4ed
modal logic; after all, if relation symbols behave the same way in all worlds, the
semantics essentially collapses since worlds cannot be distinguished.
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A valuation is a mapping from variables to the domain of a model. Since the value
assigned to a variable does not depend on worlds, it is rigid—the same in every world.
Now, the conditions for atomic formulas, modalities, and quanti4ers are these familiar
ones.
Atomic: M; v P(x1; : : : ; xn)⇔〈v(x1); : : : ; v(xn)〉 ∈I(R)().
Necessity: M; v X ⇔M; v X for all ∈G such that R.
Possibility: M; vX ⇔M; v X for some ∈G such that R.
Universal quanti9er: M; v (∀x)	⇔M; w 	 for every valuation w that is like
v except possibly on x, but w(x) must be some member of D().
Existential quanti9er: M; v (∃x)	⇔M; w 	 for some valuation w that is like
v except possibly on x, but w(x) must be some member of D().
Think of D() as the set of existent objects at possible world —this set is allowed
to vary from world to world, which is why the semantics is called varying domain.
At each world quanti4ers range over the existents of that world; this is ensured by the
condition placed on w in the quanti4er cases above. There is no requirement that an
existent at one world should also be an existent at another; neither is it forbidden. It
can happen that in evaluating the truth of a formula at a world we may encounter a
variable designating a non-existent at that world. There is no good reason why variables
must always designate existents—we can talk about a 3ying horse, we just do not think
one exists.
The quanti4cation used in this semantics is actualist. One thinks of a quanti4er as
ranging over what actually exists. Something of the 3avor of free logic is apparent—we
do not have the validity of (∀x)P(x)⊃P(y) for instance, because at a particular world
the designation of the variable y may be a non-existent, and so not be in the range
of the quanti4er. There is an obvious shortcoming here: one can never simply refer
to “everything”, existents and non-existents alike. We can say “y exists” provided we
have equality available—it is expressed by the formula (∃x)(x=y). Hence, we can
say y does not exist, ¬(∃x)(x=y)—but we cannot say “there are non-existents”, since
quanti4ers only range over existents. For some purposes this is a real limitation.
Very commonly special conditions are imposed on the domain function D: mono-
tonicity (R implies D() ⊆ D()), or anti-monotonicity (R implies D() ⊆
D()). Anti-monotonicity corresponds to the validity of the well-known Barcan schema.
But thinking of most intended applications, monotonicity and anti-monotonicity alone
are not particularly natural, and I will not discuss them further here. On the other hand,
if both conditions are imposed, we essentially get constant domain models, and these
are worth a section to themselves.
3.2. Constant domain models
A constant domain model is a structure, M= 〈G;R;D;I〉, where D is a non-empty
set, instead of a function on worlds—take it to be analogous to the domain of the model
in the varying domain case. The interpretation I is as before. Truth conditions are the
same as in the varying domain case except for the quanti4er conditions, which become
the following:
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Universal quanti9er: M; v (∀x)	⇔M; w 	 for every valuation w in D such
that w is like v except possibly on x.
Existential quanti9er: M; v (∃x)	⇔M; w 	 for some valuation w in D such
that w is like v except possibly on x.
One can, of course, think of a constant domain model as a varying domain model
in which the domain function is constant. Near the beginning of the development
of 4rst-order modal semantics, it was discovered that this could be expressed proof-
theoretically rather elegantly: a formula is valid in constant domain models just in case
it is valid in all varying domain models in which the Barcan and Converse Barcan
formulas are valid. Together these say  and (∃x) commute, as do and (∀x).
Once again, variables are interpreted rigidly. The signi4cant feature is that the do-
main of quanti4cation is the same from world to world. Now quanti4ers are called
possibilist—we can think of them as ranging over what does and what could exist,
where existence in an alternative possible world is taken to be possible existence in
this one. It is as if we started with a varying domain model, added quanti4cation over
the domain of the model, and suppressed the actualist quanti4ers. This suggests that a
semantics in which both actualist and possibilist quanti4ers were available would be
natural, and useful. Fortunately, one can get the e(ect of this rather easily.
Suppose we introduce into the language a special one-place predicate symbol, E,
which we can think of as a primitive existence predicate. Relativized quanti4ers can
then be introduced, (∀ Ex)	 for (∀x)(E(x)⊃	), and (∃ Ex)	 for (∃x)(E(x)∧	) [7,12].
In a constant domain model, we can think of relativized quanti4ers as actualist, while
the unrelativized quanti4ers are possibilist; in this way, we easily get the best of both
semantics. Technically, to make this work we need a few assumptions on the behavior
of E in models. First, at each world its interpretation should be non-empty; and second,
each member of D should be in the interpretation of E at some world. And even these
conditions can be relaxed without extreme discomfort.
Since varying domain semantics can be simulated using constant domain semantics
and relativized quanti4ers, from a semantic point of view there is really little point
in studying the varying domain version in much detail. These are not the only con-
siderations, however. Axiomatic systems intended for constant domain systems have
more complex completeness proofs. On the other hand, pre4xed tableau systems for
constant domain systems are considerably simpler than the varying domain versions.
In the present work, I will stick to constant domain semantics from now on, allowing
a primitive existence predicate and relativized quanti4ers as appropriate.
3.3. But the problems are
In the semantical systems sketched above, variables are interpreted rigidly—not
changing from world to world. While this is natural for many purposes—natural num-
bers are certainly rigid—it leads to diOculties in expressing certain things that we may
want to say. For instance, in normal models (x=y)⊃ (x=y) and (x =y)⊃ (x =y)
are both valid. Now, the morning star and the evening star are in fact identical objects,
so if x and y refer to the object that the phrases “morning star” and “evening star”
designate (in the real world), certainly (x=y) is the case, since there is only one
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object involved, and one cannot become two. But then, how do we express the very
natural thought that the morning and evening stars might have been distinct, as the
ancient Babylonians believed to be the case? There is simply no way we can do it.
Rigidity does not allow the possible distinctness of objects that are equal in fact to
ever be true.
4. Counterparts
Lewis [20,21] argues against rigid semantics because it requires that objects always
have being and be identi4able across possible worlds. I will not go into the details of his
objections. The key point for us is that he proposes a looser notion: allow an object in
a possible world to have counterparts in other worlds, rather than itself being in other
worlds as well. An object of this world could have multiple counterparts in another, or
multiple objects here could have a single counterpart in another world. This provides
much greater 3exibility in the semantics. In particular, it becomes possible to provide
counter-models to (x=y)⊃ (x=y) and to (x =y)⊃ (x =y). The counterpart idea
has been further generalized, starting with the functor semantics of Ghilardi [9,10], to
allow for multiple counterpart relations as well. I will sketch the ideas brie3y here,
beginning with a variation on the Lewis version, then moving to the more complex,
multiple counterpart version.
4.1. Counterpart models—Lewis version
What is presented here is not actually the semantics proposed by Lewis, but is a
close relative in the Lewis style. The present version is suOcient to get across the
basic ideas, and can be made closer to the real Lewis version via straightforward
modi4cations. For instance, Lewis requires that di(erent worlds contain distinct sets of
objects, while we do not, but such a condition can be imposed on a model by using
the E predicate and placing semantic restrictions on it.
The domain of a binary relation Q is the set of all x such that 〈x; y〉 ∈Q for some
y; the codomain is the set of all y such that 〈x; y〉 ∈Q for some x. A counterpart
relation on a set D is a binary relation C whose domain and codomain is D. (The
conditions on domain and codomain can be relaxed to give a more general semantics.
It is more than I want to consider here.) If v and w are two valuations in D and C is
a counterpart relation on D, I will say w is a C-counterpart to v provided, for each
variable x, 〈v(x); w(x)〉 ∈C.
A Lewis counterpart model is a structure M= 〈G;R;D;C;I〉, with everything just
as in Section 3.2 except that C has been added to the setup, where C is a func-
tion mapping each member of G × G to a counterpart relation on D. The idea is, if
〈x; y〉 ∈C(; ) then y is a counterpart, in world , of the object x in world . If 
is not accessible from  the value of C(; ) does not really matter—I will take it to
be the empty relation by convention.
Truth conditions are the same as for constant domain models except for the modal
conditions, which are replaced by the following.
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Necessity: M; v X ⇔M; w X for all ∈G such that R and for every
valuation w that is a C(; ) counterpart of v.
Possibility: M; vX ⇔M; w X for some ∈G such that R and for some
valuation w that is a C(; ) counterpart of v.
In e(ect, when moving from one world to another we replace talk of an object by
talk of its counterparts. Necessary truth requires truth at all alternative worlds, as usual,
but now we require this truth to be for all counterparts of the objects from the original
world. Possible truth is the dual.
Example 4.1. To illustrate how this works, here is a very simple Lewis counterpart
model, M= 〈G;R;D;C;I〉. The set of possible worlds is G= {; }. Accessibility
is just R, with no other case holding. The domain is D= {a; b}. The counterpart
function is C(; )= {〈a; a〉; 〈b; b〉; 〈a; b〉}, with C(X; Y ) being the empty relation in
all other cases. Finally, say P is a two-place relation symbol, and I(P) is the function
assigning the empty set to  and {〈a; b〉; 〈b; b〉} to . What I assigns to other relation
symbols will not matter for this example.
To make the discussion more perspicuous, let us say x and y are the only variables
(they are the only ones that appear in this example). Let w1 be the valuation such that
w1(x)= a and w1(y)= b; since 〈a; b〉 ∈I(P)() we have M; w1 P(x; y). Likewise,
let w2 be the valuation such that w2(x)= b and w2(y)= b; since 〈b; b〉 ∈I(P)() we
have M; w2 P(x; y).
Let v be the valuation such that v(x)= a and v(y)= b (the same as w1 as it hap-
pens). Valuations w1 and w2 are the only C(; ) counterparts of v, so we have
M; v P(x; y).
Since it is allowed for an object to have more than one counterpart at an alternative
world, it is easy to construct Lewis counterpart models that invalidate (x=y)⊃ (x=
y), though we retain the validity of (x= x)⊃ (x= x). Likewise, since di(erent objects
might have the same counterpart at an alternative world, we also lose the validity of
(x =y)⊃ (x =y). This was part of the motivation for introducing counterpart models
in the 4rst place. On the other hand, if the counterpart relation between any two worlds
is the identity function, a Lewis counterpart model is essentially a rigid model in the
sense of Section 3, so this semantics extends the earlier one.
4.2. Counterpart models—multiple-counterpart version
In order to provide a mathematically smooth approach to completeness for 4rst-order
modal logics, counterpart semantics has been generalized beyond the Lewis version
presented above. Ghilardi [9,10] uses category theory in a fundamental way; the notion
of a frame is modi4ed so that it becomes a category with worlds as objects and
morphisms supplying the counterpart notion. This functor-semantic approach has been
quite successful for logics above S4. A di(erent semantics, also based on the use of
category theory, is the metaframe semantics of [26,27,29]. Functor semantics without
category theory, loosely speaking, has been developed in [13–15,17,19]. Most people
will 4nd this more appealing than the direct use of category theory and, in addition,
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restrictions to logics above S4 are no longer imposed by the mathematics. This section
presents a mild variation of that semantics.
A multiple counterpart model is a structure M= 〈G;R;D;C;I〉, where everything
is just as in Lewis counterpart semantics, except that now C is a function mapping
each member of G × G to a set of counterpart relations on D. Rather like before, I
assume that if R does not hold then C(; ) is the empty set.
Lewis counterpart truth conditions are replaced by the following more complicated
version.
Necessity: M; v X ⇔M; w X for all ∈G such that R and for every
valuation w that is a C-counterpart of v, for every C ∈C(; ).
Possibility:M; ; vX ⇔M; w X for some ∈G such that R and for some
valuation w that is a C-counterpart of v, for some C ∈C(; ).
This carries the Lewis counterpart ideas one step further. Now necessary truth at a
world requires truth at all alternative worlds, with objects replaced by any of their
counterparts, as in the Lewis version, but also with respect to every counterpart
relation.
Example 4.2. Let M be the multiple counterpart model whose structure is the same as
the Lewis counterpart model of Example 4.1, except that C now is the function such
that C(; )=C(; )=C(; )= ∅, and C(; )= {C1; C2} where C1 = {〈a; a〉; 〈a;
b〉; 〈b; b〉} and C2 = {〈a; b〉; 〈b; a〉}. (Note: in the Lewis counterpart model of Exam-
ple 4.1, the counterpart relation between  and  was C1 of the present example.)
With valuations w1 and w2 as in Example 4.1, we of course still have M; w1 P(x; y)
and M; w2 P(x; y). Then if valuation v is as in Example 4.1, we have P(x; y) true
at  with respect to every valuation that is a C1 counterpart of v. (Essentially, this
is all as before.) But, if w3 is the valuation given by w3(x)= b and w3(y)= a, then
M;  w3 P(x; y) since 〈b; a〉 =∈I(P)(). Since w3 is a C2 counterpart of v we do not
have M; v P(x; y).
Of course the multiple counterpart semantics just presented includes the Lewis ver-
sion as a special case—just take C(; ) to be a set consisting of a single counterpart
relation whenever R. Multiple counterpart models can always be converted to Lewis
counterpart models, but this is not the case for frames [18].
4.3. Problems still
Lewis counterpart semantics provides us with a version of intensional logic. We
tend to believe there are things, objects, independent of us, and there are concepts,
which are our creations. Concepts are what we use when we talk; objects are what we
believe we are talking about. The morning star and the evening star are concepts, both
of which designate a particular object, the planet Venus.
In counterpart semantics, objects are present since they are what counterpart relations
connect, but the counterpart network is fundamental, and an object, at a world, is
actually something like a slice across that network. The morning star=evening star
object in this world has, in an alternative Babylonian world, two counterparts, one
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playing the morning star role, the other the evening star role. This raises problems of
ontology. In counterpart semantics what, exactly, is the morning star? For that matter,
what is the evening star? They cannot be the object Venus, because Venus is Venus,
no matter what, yet we do not have necessary identity between the morning star and
the evening star. The morning star is something more like a web of relationships,
connecting Venus in our world with some (actually non-existent) objects in the world
of the Babylonians, and those with still other objects in other worlds, and so on—
relationships that sometimes split and sometimes merge. In counterpart semantics, the
morning star is there in the network of relationships, somehow, but I 4nd myself unable
to point at it, 4guratively speaking. In short, I have a problem identifying the subject
matter of this semantics. Indeed, while the notion of counterpart is fundamental, there is
no way of saying this object and that one are counterparts in the formal modal language.
All of the above applies to both the Lewis version of counterpart semantics and to
the multiple counterpart version. Multiple counterpart semantics is mathematically bet-
ter behaved than Lewis counterpart semantics—[14] proves a completeness theorem that
applies to all modal predicate logics, in their terminology, making use of what they call
canonical models, which are particular multiple counterpart models. Nonetheless, the
multiple counterpart semantics has even greater problems of informal interpretation than
the Lewis version. Intuitively, what is the role of the many counterpart relations? Per-
haps eventually this will be found to be natural, but at the moment it is rather puzzling.
5. First-order intensional logic
I mentioned earlier that the two major approaches to 4rst-order modal semantics
currently under development either involve some notion of counterpart relations, or
involve intensional objects. I have been working with intensional objects for some time,
and now want to present what I think is the fullest version of a 4rst-order semantics
that uses them. I will discuss, in Section 6, in what sense counterpart relation semantics
can be encompassed within an intensional object approach.
What I propose is a semantics (and tableau system) which I call FOIL, for 9rst-
order intensional logic. Actually FOIL is a family, depending on a choice of the
underlying propositional modal logic. When necessary to be more speci4c, I will write
FOIL-S4, FOIL-S5, and the like. For the most part such speci4city is not needed here,
and I will simply refer to FOIL, meaning any one of the general family of logics.
FOIL is a variation on the system developed in [7], and amounts to the 4rst-order part
of the system of [6], which itself is an extension of the intensional logic of Montague
and Gallin [8,23–25].
In FOIL semantics models have a domain of objects, just as they did in Section 3.
This is the same for all worlds—if a varying domain version is desired we can use an
existence predicate E, as described in Section 3.2. There is quanti4cation over objects,
identity entails necessary identity; in short, we have a version of the earlier rigid
semantics.
In addition to objects, there will be what we call intensions or intensional ob-
jects or concepts. Typical informal intensions are the morning star, the oldest person
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in the world, or simply that. Intensions designate di(erent objects under di(erent
circumstances—they are non-rigid designators. As such, they will be modeled by func-
tions from possible worlds to objects. There will be quanti4cation over intensions, as
well as quanti4cation over objects.
When working with intensions two di(erent aspects naturally stand out. We can
consider an intension as a whole, or we can consider what the intension happens to
designate. Equality of intensions considered as wholes is more often called “synonymy”.
Thus, the morning star and the evening star designate the same object in the present
world, but need not do so under other circumstances—one might say they are equal
but not synonymous. On the other hand, the evening star and the 9rst heavenly body
seen in the evening are presumably synonymous and so, as a consequence, designate
the same object under all circumstances. These are distinctions we wish to capture in
a formal semantics. But this leads to a problem that deserves a section to itself.
5.1. De re=de dicto di?culties
Suppose we have a possible-world semantics with a domain of objects, as in earlier
sections. And suppose we have an intension, f, that picks out an object in each world.
Say, for instance, that the domain consists of numbers, worlds are time instances, and
at each time instance f picks out the size of the world’s population. Suppose P is a
one-place relation symbol. We could take P(f) to mean that the intension f has the
property P, or that the object designated by f has the property P. FOIL will provide
both alternatives, since both are useful. But there is a diOculty with the second version
which requires some adjustments to the language.
Suppose P(f) is to mean the object designated by f (at a world) has property
P. Then how should P(f) be interpreted, at world  say? One alternative is to
understand it as saying the thing designated by f at  (call it f) has the “possible-
P” property, and so at some alternative world  we have that f has property P. This
is traditionally called the de re reading—a possible property is ascribed to a thing.
But there is another alternative: taking the possibility operator as primary, we could
understand P(f) at  to mean that at some alternative world, , we have P(f),
and so at  the thing designated by f (call it f) has property P. This is traditionally
called the de dicto reading—possibility applies to a sentence. Now, even if  and 
turn out to be the same, there is no reason why f and f should be identical. (Unless
designation is rigid, which essentially puts us back in Section 3.)
Clearly, the de re and de dicto readings are di(erent, and both are plausible. An
abstraction mechanism has become standard to distinguish between them. Here the
de re reading will be symbolized 〈x:P(x)〉(f) and the de dicto will be symbol-
ized 〈x:P(x)〉(f). Disambiguation involves a move to a somewhat more complex
language.
5.2. The FOIL language
So far, we have been using the basic 4rst-order modal language, sketched in Sec-
tion 2. Now it must be extended. For FOIL there are two sorts of variables, object
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variables, x, y, . . . , as in previous sections, and intension variables, f; g; : : : . I will
assume each relation symbol has a type associated with it, where a type is an n-
tuple whose entries are in {O; I}. An atomic formula is an expression of the form
P(1; : : : ; n) where P is a relation symbol whose type is 〈t1; : : : ; tn〉 and, for each i, if
ti =O then i is an object variable, and if ti = I then i is an intension variable. I will
assume there is a two place relation symbol = of type 〈O;O〉. Equality of type 〈I; I〉
could also be added if desired—I will not do so. It would play the role of a synonymy
symbol.
FOIL formulas are built up from atomic formulas exactly as usual, with the fol-
lowing piece of machinery added. If 	 is a formula, x is an object variable, and f is
an intension variable, then 〈x:	〉(f) is a formula, in which the free variable occur-
rences are those of 	 except for x, together with the displayed occurrence of f. I will
sometimes abbreviate 〈x:〈y:	(g)〉(f) by 〈x; y:	〉(f; g), and so on. The idea is that
〈x:	〉(f) should say, at a world, the object designated by f at that world has the
	 property. This will be given an exact meaning in the semantics below, but perhaps
some informal examples will be useful.
Suppose P is a relation symbol of type 〈I〉. The atomic formula P(f) is intended
to assert, at a world, that the concept f has the property P. For instance, say possible
worlds are people, and f is the favorite-book concept picking out, for each person,
that person’s favorite book. And suppose P is intended to be the is-an-important-
concept predicate, which di(erent persons will apply in di(erent ways. For a person
who considers reading important, P(f) will most likely be true—the concept of a
favorite book would be important for that person. But P(f) would most likely be false
for a person who does not value reading or literature. Again, suppose Q is of type 〈O〉,
so that 〈x:Q(x)〉(f) is a formula. Let us say Q is intended to be the is-an-important-
book predicate. I certainly think 〈x:Q(x)〉(f) is true—for me it says my favorite book
is an important book (for me). I would not think 〈x: Q(x)〉(f) to be true—for me it
says that my favorite book is an important book for everybody. On the other hand, I
probably would think 〈x:Q(x)〉(f) to be true—for me it says that everybody thinks
their favorite book is important.
I have presented versions of FOIL before, but with some variations. In [7], essen-
tially this system appears, with constant symbols of intension type but no intension
variables. It was suOcient for the purposes we had in mind in that book, and adding
intension variables and quanti4ers is straightforward. The present system appeared in
[4], but there was an additional piece of machinery: an explicit operator mapping an
intension to an object at a world. Strictly speaking it was not necessary, but was in-
cluded to make the relationship with the higher-order system of [3,6] clear (such an
operator is essential when higher orders are considered). I have dropped it here, in the
interests of simplicity.
5.3. FOIL models
A FOIL model is a structure M= 〈G;R;DO;DI ;I〉 meeting the following con-
ditions. G and R are as usual. DO is a non-empty set, the object domain. DI is a
non-empty set of functions from G to DO; this is the intension domain. Finally, I
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is an interpretation such that, if P is a relation symbol of type 〈t1; : : : ; tn〉 then I(P)
is a mapping from G to subsets of Dt1 × · · · × Dtn . I will assume that I(= ) is the
constant function mapping each world to the identity relation on DO.
A valuation in FOIL model M is a mapping that assigns to each object variable a
member of DO and to each intension variable a member of DI .
Most of the various clauses of a truth de4nition are as usual. We now have two
kinds of quanti4ers, object and intension, since we have two kinds of variables, but
semantic conditions for quanti4ers are straightforward—if object variables are involved,
quanti4cation is over DO, and if intension variables are involved, quanti4cation is over
DI . The one substantially new clause is the following.
Abstraction: M; v 〈x:	〉(f) if M; w 	 where w is like v except that w(x)=
v(f)().
The idea is,M; v 〈x:	〉(f) says the object designated by f at  has the property
speci4ed by 	 at .
It is easy to see that at a world of a FOIL model, 〈x; y:(x=y)〉(f; g) asserts
intension variables f and g denote the same object. We do not have validity of the
following:
(∀f)(∀g)[〈x; y:(x = y)f; g ⊃ 〈x; y:(x = y)〉(f; g)]: (1)
Formula (1) says that if f and g designate the same object in the present world, they
will designate the same object in all accessible worlds (they will be synonymous), and
this is certainly not the case. On the other hand, we do have validity of the following:
(∀f)(∀g)[〈x; y:(x = y)〉f; g ⊃ 〈x; y: (x = y)〉(f; g)]: (2)
In words, (2) says that if the objects denoted by f and g are identical, these objects are
necessarily identical. This is so because identity between objects is necessary identity.
Indeed, since objects behave as they did in Section 3, we have the validity of the
following as well.
(∀x)(∀y)[(x = y) ⊃ (x = y)]: (3)
5.4. Other interesting formulas
I will begin with a simple formula that will be of use from time to time.
D(f; x) abbreviates 〈y:y = x〉(f)
(where x and y are distinct object variables): (4)
If D(f; x) were atomic, rather than being an abbreviation for a more complex formula,
it would be of type 〈I; O〉. Working through the FOIL semantics, M;  vD(f; x) is
true just in case v(f)()= v(x). In words, it essentially says the intension f designates
the object x at .
The domain DI of intensions in a model is required to be non-empty, and that is all.
It is not required to be the set of all functions from G to DO. Such a requirement is
undesirable for two reasons. First, not everything reasonably should be considered an
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intension. There is not much plausibility to an intention that is a wrench in this world,
a baby robin in another, and the number 7 in a third. Intensions should have some
coherence to them, and though I do not know how to characterize that, clearly not
everything mathematically possible will meet a reasonable coherence condition. The
second reason for not taking the entire set of functions from G to DO as DI is more
practical: if we do, a complete proof procedure is almost certainly beyond reach.
All this notwithstanding, there are a few extra requirements we might want to impose
on DI , saying there are “enough” members for various purposes. I now consider two
such requirements.
There is no a priori reason to believe that every object is designated by some
intension. After all, “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are
dreamt of in your philosophy”. But under special circumstances we might want a
requirement to this e(ect. Using the abbreviation of (4), we can do this by restricting
ourselves to models in which we have the validity of
(∀x)(∃f)D(f; x): (5)
If we require (5), object quanti4cation is reducible to intensional quanti4cation:
(∀x)	 ≡ (∀f)〈x:	〉(f): (6)
That is to say, the implication (5) ⊃ (6) is valid in FOIL semantics.
The other condition we might sometimes want to impose on models is the existence
of choice functions. Suppose that to each possible world  of a model we, somehow,
associate an object d in DO. If our way of choosing d can be speci4ed by a formula
of the language, it is not unreasonable to insist that it amounts to an intension. Such
a requirement cannot quite be captured in a postulate (except for FOIL-S5), but here
is something that comes close. For each formula 	
(∃x)	 ⊃ (∃f) 〈x:	〉(x): (7)
In a series of papers, Hartley Slater has argued that modal logic should be built on the
epsilon calculus; [28] makes the fundamental case for this. If one does so, he argues,
then (∃x)	⊃ (∃x) 	 will be valid. While this principle is not valid, or desirable,
in the present system, I note that (7) is actually a variation on it, split across the two
types of FOIL.
5.5. Decidability issues
Ordinarily when quanti4ers are not present in a formula, whatever the logic, the
problem of its validity is essentially a propositional one. But once the abstraction
operator and intension variables are present, things are not so simple. The following is
from [5].
For a propositional modal logic L, determined by a class of frames in the usual
sense, FOIL-L is the intensional logic built on that class of frames in the obvious
way. Now, let FOIL-L- be the restriction of FOIL-L to the sublanguage without
quanti4ers.
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(i) If L is one of K, T, or D, FOIL-L- is decidable. This can be shown using
tableaus (see Section 7).
(ii) FOIL-S5- is undecidable, with or without equality.
(iii) If = is interpreted by equality on DO (as we have required), FOIL-L- is unde-
cidable for any L between K4 and S5.
(iv) The two preceding items remain true even if formulas are restricted to contain no
object variables and only a single intension variable.
Clearly, adding intensional variables and abstraction is a major step, and not as ele-
mentary as may 4rst appear.
5.6. Partiality
In FOIL models members of DI , the domain of intensions, are functions de4ned on
the entire set of possible worlds. A plausible next step is to allow partial functions.
If this is done, one can also extend the language to allow de4nite descriptions, where
x:	 is of intension type, and is semantically treated as a partial function on worlds. I
do not develop the machinery here, but refer to [7] where a version of it is presented
at considerable length.
6. Relationships with other systems
It is obvious that the semantics of Section 3.2 embeds in FOIL. If one ignores
the intensional aspects of FOIL, rigid constant domain semantics is what remains.
Relationships between the counterpart semantics of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 and FOIL
are not so simple. A connection involving models would be nice. Better yet would
be a connection involving frames. Of course this requires us to specify what a FOIL
frame is—I propose a de4nition, in 6.2 below, of Riemann FOIL frames that seems
new to the literature, but that works quite well for these purposes. But let us begin
with cases where everything works well and there are no complications. In particular,
I begin with Lewis counterpart semantics, and postpone the more complex multiple
counterpart semantics.
6.1. Simply connected frames
Under reasonable circumstances a relation can be looked at as a collection of func-
tions. For instance, the parent-of relation is a union of the father-of function and
the mother-of function. This carries over to Lewis counterpart models, provided the
accessibility structure is not too complicated. The ideas in this section were indepen-
dently developed in [15], with somewhat di(erent terminology.
De*nition 6.1. If 〈G;R;D;C;I〉 is a Lewis counterpart model (multiple counterpart
model), I will call 〈G;R;D;C〉 a Lewis counterpart frame (multiple counterpart
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frame). Likewise, if 〈G;R;DO;DI ; I〉 is a FOIL model, I will call 〈G;R;DO;DI 〉 a
FOIL frame. And 4nally, I will call 〈G;R〉 simply a frame, as usual.
Many Lewis counterpart models can be based on a Lewis counterpart frame, by
varying the choice of an interpretation. Similarly in the multiple counterpart case.
Likewise, choices of interpretation allows us to build di(erent FOIL models on a
FOIL frame.
De*nition 6.2. Let 〈G;R〉 be a frame. Call two members  and  in G related if
R or R. By a path in the frame, I mean a sequence of members of G, 1, 2,
. . . , n, such that each term of the sequence is related to the next. A frame is simply
connected if there is just one path between any two members of G. If G0 ⊆ G, I will
say G0 is simply connected if the frame 〈G0;R0〉 is simply connected, where R0 is R
restricted to G0. I will say a Lewis counterpart frame 〈G;R;D;C〉 is simply connected
if 〈G;R〉 is simply connected, and similarly for FOIL frames.
Being simply connected really consists of two requirements: between any two worlds
there should be at least one path, and there should not be more than one. The 4rst
condition is not as signi4cant. A frame in which there are no paths between some
of the worlds can be thought of as multiple frames “stuck together”, and these can
be broken into separate frames. Details are straightforward, and well known. The key
item is the requirement that there should not be multiple paths between any pair of
worlds—no loops, in other words.
De*nition 6.3. Suppose F= 〈G;R;D;C〉 is a Lewis counterpart frame. Let f be a
function de4ned on a simply connected subset of G, mapping worlds to members of
D. I will say f is F compatible provided, for each ;  in the domain of f such that
R, f() is a counterpart of f(), that is, C(; )(f(); f()).
I omit the proof, but it is easy to show that if F= 〈G;R;D;C〉 is a simply connected
Lewis counterpart frame, then any F compatible function can be extended to an F
compatible function de4ned on the entire of G.
De*nition 6.4. If F= 〈G;R;D;C〉 is a simply connected Lewis counterpart frame, by
its companion FOIL frame I mean 〈G;R;DO;DI 〉 in which DO =D and DI is the set
of all F compatible functions with domain the entire of G.
Figs. 1 and 2 provide an elementary example of this. Fig. 1 pictures a simply
connected Lewis counterpart frame. The domain D consists of two objects, “dot” and
“square”; the counterpart relation is shown by the arrows; the accessibility relation holds
between the displayed world in the middle and the two outer worlds. Fig. 2 shows the
FOIL frame that is the companion to this. Instead of the counterpart relation, three
functions are displayed using connected lines.
In a companion frame the original counterpart relations have been replaced by func-
tions and, from them and the accessibility relation, we can reconstruct the original
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Fig. 1. Counterpart version.
Fig. 2. Function version.
counterpart notion. Simple connectedness makes all this possible. Formulas that were
evaluated in models using counterpart relations must be translated into formulas
involving functions, intensions. (A translation that is close to the one that follows
can be found in [15].)
De*nition 6.5. Let 	 be a formula in the basic 4rst-order modal language of Section 2
(hence not containing intension variables or quanti4ers, and not containing abstracts).
A formula 	∗ in the FOIL language is de4ned as follows:
(i) If A is atomic, A∗=A.
(ii) [A∧B]∗= [A∗ ∧B∗], and similarly for the other propositional connectives.
(iii) [(∀x)A]∗=(∀x)A∗, and similarly for the existential quanti4er.
(iv) Suppose the free variables of A are x1, . . . , xn (all object variables), and g1; : : : ; gn
are intension variables that do not occur in A∗. Recall the abbreviation of (4):
[ A]∗ = (∀g1) : : : (∀gn){[D(g1; x1) ∧ · · · ∧D(gn; xn)]
⊃ 〈x1; : : : ; xn:A∗〉(g1; : : : ; gn)};
[A]∗ = (∃g1) : : : (∃gn){[D(g1; x1) ∧ · · · ∧D(gn; xn)]
∧〈x1; : : : ; xn:A∗〉(g1; : : : ; gn)}:
If I is an interpretation in the sense of a Lewis counterpart model, it is also an
interpretation in the sense of a FOIL model (except that it assigns no values to relation
symbols involving intension variables, something we can ignore for now). Similarly in
the other direction. Now, the following is not hard to show.
Proposition 6.6. Let 〈G;R;D;C〉 be a simply connected Lewis counterpart frame,
and let 〈G;R;DO;DI 〉 be the companion FOIL frame. For any interpretation I on
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Fig. 3. Not simply connected.
either frame, and for any formula 	 of the basic 9rst-order modal language, 	 is
valid in 〈G;R;D;C;I〉 if and only if 	∗ is valid in 〈G;R;DO;DI ;I〉.
What this means is that any logic characterized by a class of simply connected
Lewis counterpart frames is also characterized (under translation) by a class of simply
connected FOIL frames. When simply connected frames suOce, FOIL includes, under
translation, Lewis counterpart semantics.
6.2. Riemannization
An embedding between Lewis counterpart frames and FOIL frames works well
in the simply connected case, but what about frames that are not simply connected?
The problem is that if a frame is not simply connected, it may not be possible to
replace a counterpart relation by a collection of functions. Fig. 3 shows the diOculties
that can arise. Following the upper accessibility chain, the “dot” object in world 
corresponds to dot which corresponds to dot in world , while following the lower
chain it corresponds to “box” which corresponds to box in world . A similar thing
happens starting with the object box of world . Such counterpart relations cannot be
treated as the union of a collection of functions, as we did when simply connected
frames were considered.
One way of putting the diOculty is that replacing counterpart relations by functions
can lead to many-valued functions, as it would in the example shown in Fig. 3. A
similar problem once arose in complex analysis with the square root function, the
logarithm function, and many others. The solution was to break the complex plane
into multiple copies of itself—into separate sheets—producing a Riemann surface. A
similar solution applies here. To continue with the example of Fig. 3, suppose we
introduce two copies of world . What makes them copies is that we will require
any interpretation to assign the same relations to relation symbols at both copies. With
 split in two in this way, the counterpart relationship can be “functionalized”, as
shown in Fig. 4. Perhaps one could plausibly think of the split version of  as being a
situation seen in two di(erent ways (with the possibility of not recognizing we really
have two aspects of the same thing). This leads us to the following generalization of
the notion of FOIL frame.
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Fig. 4. “Riemannized” version.
De*nition 6.7. A Riemann FOIL frame is a pair 〈F;E〉, where F= 〈G;R;DO;DI 〉 is
a FOIL frame as in De4nition 6.1, and E is an equivalence relation on G. If possible
worlds ; ∈G are in the relation E to each other, I will say each is a copy of the
other. A FOIL model 〈G;R;DO;DI ;I〉 is based on the Riemann FOIL frame 〈F;E〉
provided the interpretation I respects the equivalence relation E in the following
sense: for each relation symbol P and for each ; ∈G that are in the relation E,
I(P)()=I(P)(). A formula is valid in a Riemann frame if it is valid in every
FOIL model based on the frame.
In e(ect, what makes two possible worlds copies is that in any model based on a
Riemann FOIL frame atomic formulas behave the same at the two worlds. Of course
beyond the atomic level this need not be the case. The notion of Riemann FOIL frame
extends that of FOIL frame as used earlier—simply take as equivalence relation the
one that relates each world to itself and to nothing else. Now, using the notions of
frame for counterpart semantics from De4nition 6.1 we have the following fundamental
result.
Proposition 6.8. For any Lewis or multiple counterpart frame S there is a Riemann
FOIL frameT such that, for every formula 	 in the basic 9rst-order modal language,
	 is valid in S if and only if 	∗ is valid inT (using the translation of De9nition 6.5).
An example illustrating Proposition 6.8 when Lewis counterpart frames are involved
is given by Figs. 3 and 4. I will leave details to you. The situation with multiple coun-
terpart frames is, perhaps, of greater interest. Example 6.9 is based on an interesting
such frame due to Oliver Kutz.
Example 6.9. Let S be the multiple counterpart frame 〈G;R;D;C〉 speci4ed as fol-
lows. G= {}, R, D= {a; b}, and C= {C1; C2}, where C1 = {〈a; a〉; 〈b; b〉} and
C2 = {〈a; b〉; 〈b; a〉}. Kutz [18] provides an axiomatization of the logic of this frame
(in the basic 4rst-order modal language, involving equality), and shows it cannot be
characterized by a class of Lewis counterpart frames. In short, multiple counterpart
relations are essential.
Now, let T be the FOIL frame 〈G′;R′;DO;DI 〉 sketched in the following diagram.
In this, G′= {1; 2}, R′ holds universally, DO =D= {a; b}, and DI consists of the
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two functions indicated in the diagram by the light and dark lines.
R2R1 ✘✘✘
✘✘✘✧✦
✥
a
bb
a
✧✦
✥
Finally, consider the Riemann FOIL frame 〈T;E〉 where E is the universal equivalence
relation on G′ (thus being the same as R′, though this is simply coincidence). I leave
it to you to verify for this example that a basic modal formula 	 is valid in S if and
only if 	∗ is valid in 〈T;E〉.
As a particularly interesting special case, note that even though S is a one-world
model, it does not follow that every formula of the form X ⊃ X is valid. For instance,
A(x; y)⊃ A(x; y) fails using an interpretation I that assigns to A at  the set {〈a; b〉},
and using a valuation v such that v(x)= a and v(y)= b. Now, [A(x; y)⊃ A(x; y)]∗ is
the formula A(x; y)⊃ (∀f)(∀g){[D(f; x)∧D(g; y)]⊃ 〈x; y:A(x; y)〉(f; g)}. This fails
at 1 of the Riemann FOIL frame using an interpretation that agrees with I at both
1 and 2, and the same valuation v.
The status of the schema X ⊃X is also worth thinking about.
I do not include a proof of Proposition 6.8 here. One can be found, using di(erent
terminology, in [15]. The methodology involved amounts to unwinding a counterpart
frame.
7. Tableaus
Tableau systems using pre4xes go back to [1,2]. A smoother, more uniform approach
was developed in [11,22]. In [6,7], variations that allowed for intensional constant
symbols and variables were studied at some length. For FOIL, pre4xed tableaus give
us a natural and simple proof procedure, at least for standard logics like K, S4, S5,
and so on. I sketch the ideas here.
Pre4xes are intended to be syntactic names for possible worlds, with a structure
that re3ects the accessibility relation in a convenient way. I will present a system for
FOIL-K; for several other FOIL-based logics modi4cations are straightforward, and
for FOIL-S5 things can be made considerably simpler, but FOIL-K will serve as a
paradigm case.
A pre9x is a 4nite sequence of positive integers, and a pre9xed formula is an
expression of the form !	, where ! is a pre4x and 	 is a formula. I write pre4xes
as 1.2.3.2.1, for example. If ! is a pre4x and n is a positive integer, !:n is ! with
n adjoined. Intuitively, a pre4x ! names a possible world in some model, and !	
says that 	 is true at the world ! names. The pre4x !:n is intended to name a world
accessible from the one that ! names. A tableau will contain pre4xed formulas as node
labels.
A tableau proof of a closed formula 	 is a tree with 1¬	 at its root, that is “grown”
according to certain Branch Extension Rules, and that is closed. A tableau is closed
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if each branch is closed, and a branch is closed if it contains !X and !¬X , for some
! and some X . Here are the Branch Extension Rules for FOIL-K. In the following, !
is an arbitrary pre4x. Also, if 	(x) has been displayed, then 	(y) denotes the formula
	(x) with all free occurrences of x replaced by occurrences of y.
First the propositional rules, taking ∧ as a representative binary connective:
!X ∧ Y
!X
!Y
!¬(X ∧ Y )
!¬X
∣
∣
∣!¬Y
!¬¬X
!X
Next the modal rules:
!X
!:nX
!¬ X
!:n¬X where !:n is new to the branch;
! X
!:nX
!¬X
!:n¬X where !:n already occurs on the branch:
For existential quanti4ers the language is extended in the usual way. That is, for each of
the types, object and intension, new alphabets of variables are added to the language—
these are called parameters. Parameters, though variables, are never quanti4ed, and
only appear in proofs. In the following, y is an object parameter that is new to the
branch and g is an intension parameter that is new to the branch:
!(∃x)	(x)
!	(y)
!¬(∀x)	(x)
!¬	(y)
!(∃f)"(f)
!"(g)
!¬(∀f)"(f)
!¬"(g) :
To take care of abstraction still more variables are introduced which will only appear
in proofs. If f is a parameter of intension type and ! is a pre4x, f! is a new variable
of object type. Think of it as what the non-rigid symbol f designates at the world
named by !:
!〈x:	(x)〉(f)
!	(f!)
!¬〈x:	(x)〉(f)
!¬	(f!)
For universal quanti4ers we have more-or-less the expected rules. In the following g
is any parameter of intension type, and y is either a parameter of object type, or a
subscripted intension parameter whose subscript already occurs on the branch:
!(∀x)	(x)
!	(y)
!¬(∃x)	(x)
!¬	(y)
!(∀f)"(f)
!"(g)
!¬(∃f)"(f)
!¬"(g)
Example 7.1. Here is a sample proof in FOIL-K, of
(∀f)[(∀x) P(x)⊃ 〈x:P(x)〉(f)] :
(1) 1 ¬(∀f)[(∀x) P(x)⊃ 〈x:P(x)〉(f)]
(2) 1 ¬[(∀x) P(x)⊃ 〈x:P(x)〉(g)]
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(3) 1 (∀x) P(x)
(4) 1 ¬ 〈x:P(x)〉(g)]
(5) 1:1 ¬〈x:P(x)〉(g)
(6) 1:1 ¬P(g1:1)
(7) 1 P(g1:1)
(8) 1:1 P(g1:1)
Line 2 is from 1 by an existential rule, with g as a new intension parameter; 3 and
4 are from 2 by a propositional rule; 5 is from 4 by a modal rule (1.1 is new to the
branch); 6 is from 5 by an abstraction rule; 7 is from 3 by a universal rule (g1:1 is of
object type); 8 is from 7 by a modal rule (1.1 already occurs on the branch). Closure
is by 6 and 8.
Soundness of the tableau system is straightforward. Here is a sketch of complete-
ness. If 	 is not provable, systematically construct a tableau beginning with 1¬	,
so that every applicable rule is eventually applied. Choose an open branch of the
resulting tableau. (Construction may run in4nitely long, and KSonig’s Lemma may be
needed here.) Use that open branch to construct a counter-model to 	 as follows. Take
as worlds the pre4xes occurring on the branch, with !:n accessible from !. Objects
are object parameters and subscripted intension parameters. Intensions are intension
parameters. At world ! the intension parameter f designates the object f!. A rela-
tion symbol P is interpreted to be the mapping assigning to possible world ! the set
{〈t1; : : : ; tn〉|!P(t1; : : : ; tn) is on !}. It is not hard to show this gives a model in which
	 is false (at world 1).
To extend the tableau system to allow for equality, two more rules must be added.
First, re3exivity: If t is a parameter of object type, or a subscripted parameter of
intension type whose subscript already occurs on the branch, and ! is a pre4x that
occurs on the tableau branch, then !(t= t) can be added to the end of the branch.
Second, substitutivity: Let 	(x) be a formula in which at most x occurs free, and
let t and u be terms of object type. If !1(t= u) and !2	(t) both occur on a tableau
branch, !2	(u) can be added to the end.
Example 7.2. Here is a sample proof in FOIL-K with equality, of (∀f){〈x: 〈y:x=
y〉(f)〉(f)⊃ [ 〈x:P(x)〉(f)⊃〈x: P(x)〉(f)]}:
(1) 1 ¬(∀f){〈x: 〈y:x=y〉(f)〉(f)⊃ [ 〈x:P(x)〉(f)⊃〈x: P(x)〉(f)]}
(2) 1 ¬{〈x: 〈y:x=y〉(g)〉(g)⊃ [ 〈x:P(x)〉(g)⊃〈x: P(x)〉(g)]}
(3) 1 〈x: 〈y:x=y〉(g)〉(g)
(4) 1 ¬[ 〈x:P(x)〉(g)⊃〈x: P(x)〉(g)]
(5) 1 〈x:P(x)〉(g)
(6) 1 ¬〈x: P(x)〉(g)
(7) 1 ¬ P(g1)
(8) 1:1 ¬P(g1)
(9) 1:1 〈x:P(x)〉(g)
(10) 1:1 P(g1:1)
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(11) 1 〈y:g1 =y〉(g)
(12) 1:1 〈y:g1 =y〉(g)
(13) 1:1 g1 = g1:1
(14) 1:1 P(g1:1)
Line 2 is from 1 by an existential rule; 3 and 4 are from 2, and 5 and 6 are from 4
by propositional rules; 7 is from 6 by an abstraction rule; 8 is from 7 by a modal rule;
9 is from 5 by a modal rule; 10 is from 9 by an abstraction rule; 11 is from 3 by an
abstraction rule; 12 is from 11 by a modal rule; 13 is from 12 by an abstraction rule;
14 is from 8 and 13 by the substitutivity rule. Closure is by 10 and 14.
For other logics besides K, if there is a propositional pre4xed tableau system it
readily adapts to a FOIL version, as above. For S5 things are particularly simple,
since worlds can be taken to be mutually accessible. In this case the pre4x structure
can be simpli4ed to just integers, instead of sequences of them.
8. Conclusion
What 4rst-order modal logics are and ought to be is still a question very much
under discussion. Mathematically, various versions of counterpart semantics have been
intensively examined in recent years. I put FOIL-based logics forward as a counter-foil,
so to speak. I suggest FOIL provides a very rich setting with a satisfying intuition. If
Riemann FOIL frames are allowed, the expressive power is as great as with multiple
counterpart semantics. Of course one might argue that having multiple copies of worlds
has no corresponding intuition, but I think this is equally the case with having multiple
counterpart relations. The question basically is, without such machinery added, how
intuitively plausible and how easy to use is the resulting semantics. I believe a very
good case can be made for FOIL. This paper amounts to a partial presentation of that
case.
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